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ABSTRACT
Smartphone apps usually have access to sensitive user data
such as contacts, geo-location, and account credentials and
they might share such data to external entities through the
Internet or with other apps. Confidentiality of user data
could be breached if there are anomalies in the way sensi-
tive data is handled by an app which is vulnerable or mali-
cious. Existing approaches that detect anomalous sensitive
data flows have limitations in terms of accuracy because the
definition of anomalous flows may differ for different apps
with different functionalities; it is normal for “Health” apps
to share heart rate information through the Internet but is
anomalous for “Travel” apps.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to detect
anomalous sensitive data flows in Android apps, with im-
proved accuracy. To achieve this objective, we first group
trusted apps according to the topics inferred from their func-
tional descriptions. We then learn sensitive information
flows with respect to each group of trusted apps. For a given
app under analysis, anomalies are identified by comparing
sensitive information flows in the app against those flows
learned from trusted apps grouped under the same topic.
In the evaluation, information flow is learned from 11,796
trusted apps. We then checked for anomalies in 596 new
(benign) apps and identified 2 previously-unknown vulner-
able apps related to anomalous flows. We also analyzed 18
malware apps and found anomalies in 6 of them.
1. INTRODUCTION
Android applications (apps) are often granted access to
users’ privacy- and security-sensitive information such as
GPS position, phone contacts, camera, microphone, training
log, and heart rate. Apps need such sensitive data to imple-
ment their functionalities and provide rich user experiences.
For instance, accurate GPS position is needed to navigate
users to their destinations, phone contact is needed to im-
plement messaging and chat functionalities, and heart rate
frequency is important to accurately monitor training im-
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provements.
Often, to provide services, apps may also need to exchange
data with other apps in the same smartphone or externally
with a remote server. For instance, a camera app may share
a picture with a multimedia messaging app for sending it
to a friend. The messaging app, in turn, may send the full
contacts list from the phone directory to a remote server in
order to identify which contacts are registered to the mes-
saging service so that they can be shown as possible desti-
nations.
As such, sensitive information may legitimately be prop-
agated via message exchanges among apps or to remote
servers. On the other hand, sensitive information might be
exposed unintentionally by defective/vulnerable apps or in-
tentionally by malicious apps (malware), which threatens
the security and privacy of end users. Existing literature
on information leak in smartphone apps tend to overlook
the difference between legitimate data flows and illegitimate
ones. Whenever information flow from a sensitive source to
a sensitive sink is detected, either statically [23], [20], [19,
15, 3], [22], [17], [12] or dynamically [8], it is reported as
potentially problematic.
In this paper, we address the problem of detecting anoma-
lous information flows with improved accuracy by classifying
cases of information flows as either normal or anomalous ac-
cording to a reference information flow model. More specif-
ically, we build a model of sensitive information flows based
on the following features:
• Data source: the provenance of the sensitive data that
is being propagated;
• Data sink: the destination where the data is flowing
to; and
• App topic: the declared functionalities of the app ac-
cording to its description.
Data source and data sink features are used to reflect infor-
mation flows from sensitive sources to sinks and summarize
how sensitive data is handled by an app. However, these fea-
tures are not expressive enough to build an accurate model.
In fact, distinct apps might have very different function-
alities. What is considered legitimate of a particular set of
apps (e.g., sharing contacts for a messaging app) can be con-
sidered a malicious behavior for other apps (e.g., a piece of
malware that steals contacts, to be later used by spammers).
An accurate model should also take into consideration the
main functionalities that is declared by an app (in our case
the App topic). One should classify an app as anomalous
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only when it exhibits sensitive information flows that are
not consistent with its declared functionalities. This char-
acteristic, which makes an app anomalous, is captured by
the App topic feature.
In summary, our approach focuses on detecting apps that
are anomalous in terms of information flows compared to
other apps with similar functionalities. Such an approach
would be useful for various stakeholders. For example, mar-
ket owners (e.g., Google) can focus on performing more com-
plex and expensive security analysis only on those cases that
are reported as anomalous, before publishing them. If such
information is available to end users, they could also make
informed decision of whether or not to install the anomalous
app. For example, when the user installs an app, a warning
stating that this particular app sends contact information
through the Internet differently from other apps with simi-
lar functionalities (as demonstrated in the tool website). In
the context of BYOD (bring your own device) where em-
ployees use their own device to connect to the secure cor-
porate network, a security analyst might benefit from this
approach to emphasis manual analysis on those anomalous
flows that might compromise the confidentiality of corporate
data stored in the devices.
The specific contributions of this paper are:
• An automated, fast approach for detecting anomalous
flows of sensitive information in Android apps through
a seamless combination of static analysis, natural lan-
guage processing, model inference, and classification
techniques;
• The implementation of the proposed approach in a tool
called AnFlo which is publicly available1; and
• An extensive empirical evaluation of our approach based
on 596 subject apps, which assesses the accuracy and
runtime performance of anomalous information flow
detection. We detected 2 previous-unknown vulnera-
ble apps related to anomalous flows. We also analyzed
18 malware apps and found anomalies in 6 of them.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
motivates this work. Section 3 compares our work with lit-
erature. Section 4 first gives an overview of our approach
and then explains the steps in details. Section 5 evaluates
our approach. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. MOTIVATION
To implement their services, apps may access sensitive
data. It is important that application code handling such
data follows secure coding guidelines to protect user privacy
and security. However, fast time-to-market pressure often
pushes developers to implement data handling code quickly
without considering security implications and release apps
without proper testing. As a result, apps might contain
defects that leak sensitive data unintentionally. They may
also contain security vulnerabilities such as permission re-
delegation vulnerabilities [9], which could be exploited by
malicious apps installed on the same device to steal sensi-
tive data. Sensitive data could also be intentionally misused
by malicious apps. Malicious apps such as malware and spy-
ware often implement hidden functionalities not declared in
1Tool and dataset available at http://selab.fbk.eu/anflo/
their functional descriptions. For example, a malicious app
may declare only entertainment features (e.g., games) in its
description, but it steals user data or subscribes to paid ser-
vices without the knowledge and consent of the user.
Defective, vulnerable, and malicious apps all share the
same pattern, i.e., they (either intentionally or unintention-
ally) deal with sensitive data in an anomalous way, i.e.,
they behave differently in terms of dealing with sensitive
data compared to other apps that state similar functionali-
ties. Therefore, novel approaches should focus on detecting
anomalies in sensitive data flows, caused by mismatches be-
tween expected flows (observed in benign and correct apps)
and actual data flows observed in the app under analysis.
However, the comparison should be only against similar
apps that offer similar functionalities. For instance, mes-
saging apps are expected to read information from phone
contact list but they are not expected to use GPS position.
These observations motivate our proposed approach.
3. RELATED WORK
The approaches proposed in Mudflow [5] and Chabada [10]
are closely related to ours. Mudflow [5] is a tool for malware
detection based on sensitive information flow. Similar to our
approach, they rely on static taint analysis to detect flows of
sensitive data towards potential leaks. Then, these flows are
used to train a ν−SVM one-class classifier and later classify
new apps. While we also use static analysis, the main dif-
ference is that we consider the dominant topic inferred from
app description as an important feature for the classifica-
tion. Our empirical evaluation shows that dominant topics
are fundamental to achieve a higher accuracy in anomaly
detection. Moreover, our approach not only focuses on de-
tecting malware, but also focuses on vulnerable and defective
apps. Lastly, while Mudflow applies intra-component static
analysis, we use inter-component analysis for covering flows
across components.
Chabada [10] is a tool to find apps whose descriptions
differ from their implementations. While we apply similar
techniques in terms of natural language processing of apps
descriptions, the goals differ. The goal of their approach is
to find anomalous apps among the apps in the wild based
on the inconsistencies between the advertised apps descrip-
tions and their actual behaviors. By contrast, our approach
specifically targets at identifying anomalies in the flow of
sensitive information in the app code. More specifically,
Chabada only identifies calls to sensitive APIs to charac-
terize benign and anomalous apps. By contrast, we consider
data flows from sensitive data sources to sensitive sinks.
Information leak in mobile apps is a widespread secu-
rity problem. Many approaches that deal with this security
problem are related to ours. Information flow in mobile apps
is analysed either statically [23], [20], [19], [22], [17], [15], [12]
or dynamically [8], to detect disclosure of sensible informa-
tion. Tainted sources are system calls that access private
data (e.g., global position, contacts entries), while sinks are
all the possible ways that make data leave the system (e.g.,
network transmissions). An issue is detected when privi-
leged information could potentially leave the app through
one of the sinks. In the following, we discuss some of these
approaches and then explain the major differences.
Amandroid [23] has been proposed to detect privacy data
leaks due to inter-component communication (ICC) in An-
droid apps. Epicc [20] identifies ICC connection points by
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using inter-procedural data-flow and points-to analysis. IC3
[19] improves Epicc by resolving targets and values used in
ICC. Tsutano et al. [22] propose JITANA to analyze inter-
acting apps. It works in a similar fashion as Epicc but in-
stead of combing apps for analysis, it uses static class loader
which allows it to analyze large number of interacting apps.
IccTA [15] attempts to improve static taint analysis of An-
droid apps in ICC by using IC3 to resolve ICC targets and by
modeling the life-cycle and callback methods. DidFail [12]
attempts to detect data leaks between activities through im-
plicit intents. It does not consider other components and
explicit intents. Grace et al. [11] perform static analysis in
stock Android apps released by different vendors, to check
the presence of any information leak. Since vendors modify
or introduce their own apps, they might also introduce new
vulnerabilities. The work, however, is limited to stock apps
on specific vendor devices.
TaintDroid [8] is a tool for performing dynamic taint anal-
ysis. It relies on a modified Android installation that tracks
tainted data at run-time. The implementation showed min-
imal size and computational overhead, and was effective in
analyzing many real Android apps. A complementary ap-
proach is based on static analysis [17], where a type system
is implemented to track security levels. It detects violations
when privileged information could potentially leave the app
through a sink.
Similar to our approach, the above-mentioned approaches
apply static analysis techniques on mobile code to detect
information flows from sources to sinks. However, our ap-
proach does not report all sensitive data flows into sinks as
information leak problems because they might be intended
behaviors of the app. Our approach classifies information
flows in an app as anomalous only when they deviate from
normal behaviors of other similar apps. In addition, it de-
tects not only cases of information leaks, but also cases of
anomalies in data flows that might reveal security defects,
such as permission re-delegation vulnerabilities.
Other closely related work is about detecting permission
re-delegation vulnerabilities in apps. Felt et al. [9] presented
the permission re-delegation problems, and their approach
detects them whenever there exists a path from a public
entry point to a privileged API call. Chin et al. [7] and Lu et
al. [16] also detect permission re-delegation vulnerabilities.
However, as acknowledged by Felt et al. and Chin et al.,
their approaches cannot differentiate between legitimate and
illegitimate permission re-delegation behaviors.
Zhang et al. [24] proposed Appsealer, a runtime patch to
mitigate permission re-delegation problem. They perform
static data flow analysis to determine sensitive data flows
from sources to sinks and apply a patch before the invoca-
tions of privileged APIs such that the app alerts the user
of potential permission re-delegation attacks and requests
the user’s authorization to continue. This is an alternative
way of distinguishing normal behaviors and abnormal ones
by relying on the user. Lee et al. [14] also proposed a sim-
ilar approach but they extended the Android framework to
track ICC vulnerabilities instead of patching the app. In-
stead of relying on the user, who might not be aware of
security implications, we resort to a model that reflects nor-
mal information flow behaviors to detect anomalies in the
flow of sensitive information.
4. ANOMALOUS INFORMATION FLOW DE-
TECTION
4.1 Overview
The overview of our approach is shown in Figure 1. It
has two main phases — Learning and Classification. The
input to the learning phase is a set of apps that are trusted
to be benign and correct in the way sensitive data is han-
dled (we shall denote them as trusted apps). It has two
sub-steps — feature extraction and model inference. In the
feature extraction step, (i) topics that best characterize the
trusted apps are inferred using natural language processing
(NLP) techniques and (ii) information flows from sensitive
sources to sinks in the trusted apps are identified using static
taint analysis. In the model inference step, we build sensi-
tive information model that characterizes information flows
regarding each topic.
These models and a given app under analysis (we shall
denote it as AUA) are the inputs to the classification phase.
In this phase, basically, the dominant topic of the AUA is
first identified to determine the relevant sensitive informa-
tion flow model. Then, if the AUA contains any information
flow that violates that model, i.e., is not consistent with the
common flows characterized by the model, it is flagged as
anomalous. Otherwise, it is flagged as normal.
We implemented this approach in our tool AnFlo to au-
tomate the detection of anomalous information flows. How-
ever, a security analyst is required to further inspect those
anomalous flows and determine whether or not the flows
could actually lead to serious vulnerabilities such as infor-
mation leakage issues.
4.2 Feature Extraction
4.2.1 Topic Analysis
In this step, we analyze the functionalities declared by the
trusted apps. Using NLP, we extract topics from the app de-
scriptions available at the official App Store, where apps de-
veloper declare their intended functionalities. We fist apply
data pre-processing to cleanse app descriptions and then we
perform topic discovery on the pre-processed descriptions to
extract the topics that are likely to be associated with.
App descriptions pre-processing. To apply NLP on app
descriptions, we need one common language across all apps.
Therefore, firstly apps with no English description are fil-
tered. We use Google’s Compact Language Detector2 to
detect English language in app descriptions.
Next, stopwords in app descriptions are removed. They
are words that do not contribute to topic discovery, such as
“a”, “after”, “is”, “in”, “as”, “very”, etc3. Subsequently, the
Stanford CoreNLP lemmatizer4 is used to apply lemmati-
zation, which basically abstracts the words having similar
meanings so that they can be analyzed as a single item. For
instance, the words “car”, “truck”, “motorcycle” appearing in
the descriptions can be lemmatized as “vehicle”. Last, stem-
ming [21] is applied to reduce words to their radix. Different
forms of a word such as “travel”, “traveling”, “travels”, and
“traveler” are replaced by their common base form “travel”.
2https://github.com/CLD2Owners/cld2
3see the list of common English stopwords at www.ranks.
nl/stopwords
4http://stanfordnlp.github.io/CoreNLP/
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Figure 1: Overview of the approach.
Topics discovery. Topics representative of a given pre-
processed app description are identified using the Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) technique [6], implemented in a
tool called Mallet [18]. LDA is a generative statistical model
that represents a collection of text as a mixture of topics with
certain probabilities, where each word appearing in the text
is attributable to one of the topics. The output of LDA is a
list of topics, each of them with its corresponding probabil-
ity. The topic with the highest probability is labeled as the
dominant topic for its associated app.
To illustrate, Figure 2 shows the functional description
of an app called BestTravel, and the resulting output after
performing pre-processing and topics discovery on the de-
scription. “Travel” is the dominant topic, the one with the
highest probability of 70%. Then, the topics “Communi-
cation”, “Finance”, and “Photography” have the 15%, 10%,
and 5% probabilities, respectively, of being the functionali-
ties that the app declares to provide.
The ultimate and most convenient way of traveling.
Use BestTravel while on the move, to find restau-
rants (including pictures and prices), local trans-
portation schedule, ATM machines and much more.
App name Travel Communication Finance Photography
BestTravel 70% 15% 10% 5%
Figure 2: Example of app description and topic analysis
result.
Note that we did not consider Google Play categories as
topics even though apps are grouped under those categories
in Google Play. This is because recent studies [1, 10] have
reported that NLP-based topic analysis on app descriptions
produces more cohesive clusters of apps than those apps
grouped under Google Play categories.
4.2.2 Static Analysis
Sensitive information flows in the trusted apps are ex-
tracted using static taint analysis. Taint analysis is an in-
stance of flow-analysis technique, which tags program data
with labels that describe its provenance and propagates these
tags through control and data dependencies. A different la-
bel is used for each distinct source of data. Tags are prop-
agated from the operand(s) in the right-hand side of an as-
signment (uses) to the variable assigned in the left-hand side
of the assignment (definition). The output of taint analysis
is information flows, i.e., what data of which provenances
(sources) are accessed at what program operations, e.g., on
channels that may leak sensitive information (sinks).
Our analysis focuses on the flows of sensitive information
into sensitive program operations, i.e., our taint analysis
generates tags at API calls that read sensitive information
(e.g. GPS and phone contacts) and traces the propagation
of tags into API calls that perform sensitive operations such
as sending messages and Bluetooth packets. These sen-
sitive APIs usually belong to dangerous permission group
and hence, the APIs that we analyze are those privileged
APIs that require to be specifically granted by the end user.
Sources and sinks are the privileged APIs available from
PScout [4]. The APIs that we analyze also include those
APIs that enable Inter Process Communication (IPC) mech-
anism of Android because they can be used to exchange data
among apps installed on the same device.
As a result, our taint analysis generates a list of (source→
sink) pairs, where each pair represents the flow of sensitive
data originating from a source into a sink.
APIs (both for sources and for sinks) are grouped accord-
ing to the special permission required to run them. For ex-
ample, all the network related sink functions, such as open-
Connection(), connect() and getContent() are all mod-
eled as Internet sinks, because they all require the INTER-
NET permission to be executed. Figure 3 shows the static
taint analysis result on the “BestTravel” running example
app from Figure 2. It generates two (source → sink) pairs
that correspond to two sensitive information flows. In the
first flow, data read from the GPS is propagated through
the program until it reaches a statement where it is sent
over the network. In the second flow, data from the phone
contacts is used to compose a text message.
App: BestTravel
GPS → Internet
Contacts → SMS
Figure 3: Example of static analysis result.
Our tool, AnFlo, runs on compiled byte-code of apps to
perform the above static taint analysis. It relies on two ex-
isting tools — IC3 [19] and IccTA [15]. Android apps are
usually composed of several components. Therefore, to pre-
cisely extract inter-component information flows, we need to
analyze the links among components. AnFlo uses IC3 to re-
solve the target components when a flow is inter-component.
IC3 uses a solver to infer all possible values of complex ob-
jects in an inter-procedural, flow- and context-sensitive man-
ner. Once inter-component links are inferred, AnFlo uses an
inter-component data-flow analysis tool called IccTA to per-
form static taint analysis. We customized IccTA to produce
flows in a format as presented in Figure 3 and paths in a
more verbose format to facilitate manual checks.
4
4.3 Model Inference
When results of topic analysis and of static analysis are
available for all the trusted apps, they are used to build the
Sensitive Information Flow Model. Such a model is a matrix
with sensitive information sources in its rows and sinks in
its columns, as shown in Figure 4.
Firstly, apps with the same dominant topic are grouped
together5, to build a sensitive information flow model cor-
responding to that specific topic. Each group is labeled
with the dominant topic. Next, each cell of the matrix is
filled with a number, representing the number of apps in
this group having the corresponding (source→ sink) pair.
Figure 4 shows a sample sensitive information model re-
garding the topic “Travel”. There are 36 distinct flows in
the apps grouped under this dominant topic. The matrix
shows that there are ten apps containing GPS position flow-
ing through the Internet (one of them being the BestTravel
app, see Figure 3); eight apps through text messages and
three apps through Bluetooth. Similarly, the matrix shows
that contacts information flows through SMS in seven apps
and through Bluetooth in eight apps.
Topic: “Travel” Sinks
Sources Internet SMS Bluetooth
GPS 10 8 3
Contacts 0 7 8
Figure 4: Example of sensitive information flow model.
From this model, we can observe that for Travel apps it is
quite common to share the user’s position via Internet and
SMS. However, it is quite uncommon to share the position
data via Bluetooth since it happened only in three cases.
Likewise, the phone contacts are commonly shared through
text messages and Bluetooth but not through Internet.
To provide a formal and operative definition of common
and uncommon flows, we compute a threshold denoted as τ .
Flows that occur more than or equal to τ are considered as
common; flows that never occur or that occur fewer than τ
are considered as uncommon regarding this topic.
Although our model assumes or trusts that the trusted
apps are benign and correct, it is possible that some of them
may contain defects, vulnerabilities or malware. This prob-
lem is addressed by classifying those flows occurring less
than the threshold τ as uncommon, i.e., our approach toler-
ates the presence of some anomalous flows in the reference
model since these flows would still be regarded as uncom-
mon. Hence, our approach works as long as the majority of
the trusted apps are truly trustworthy.
To compute this threshold, we adopt the box-plot ap-
proach proposed by Laurikkala et al. [13], considering only
flows occurring in the model, i.e., we consider only values
greater than zero. τ is computed in the same way as draw-
ing outlier dots in boxplots. It is the lower quartile (25th
percentile) minus the step, where the step is 1.5 times the
difference between the upper quartile (75th percentile) and
the lower quartile (25th percentile). It should be noted that
τ is not trivially the lower quartile; otherwise 25% of the
5We also experimented with a more elaborated model that
considers multiple topics and their probabilities instead of
just the dominant topic for grouping the apps. However,
since their detection accuracy did not improve, we opted for
the simplest model, with just the dominant topic.
apps would be outliers by construction. The threshold is
lower, i.e., it is the lower quartile minus the step. There-
fore, there is no fixed amount of outliers. Outliers could be
few or many depending on the distribution of data. Outliers
would only be those cases that are really different from the
majority of the training data points.
In the example regarding topic “Travel” in Figure 4, the
threshold is computed considering only the five values that
are > 0. The value for the threshold is τTravel = 7. It
means that GPS data sent through Internet (GPS → Inter-
net) or text messages (GPS → SMS) are common for trav-
eling apps. Conversely, even though there are three trusted
apps which send GPS data through Bluetooth (GPS→ Blue-
tooth), there are too few cases to be considered common, and
this sensitive information flow will be considered uncommon
in the model. Likewise, phone contacts are commonly sent
through text messages and Bluetooth, but it is uncommon
for them to be sent through the Internet, since this never
occurs in the trusted apps.
4.4 Classification
After the Sensitive Information Flow Models are built
on trusted apps, they can be used to classify a new AUA.
First of all, features must be extracted from the AUA. The
features are the topics associated with the app description
and the sensitive information flows in the app. As in Sec-
tion 4.2.1, first data pre-processing is performed on the app
description of the AUA. Then, topics and their probabil-
ities are inferred from the pre-processed description using
the Mallet tool. Among all the topics, we consider only the
dominant topic, the one with the highest probability, be-
cause it is the topic that most characterizes this app. We
then obtain the Sensitive Information Flow Model associ-
ated with this dominant topic.
To ensure the availability of the Sensitive Information
Flow Model, the Mallet tool is configured with the list of
topics for which the Models are already built on the trusted
apps. And given an app description, the Mallet tool only
generates topics from this list. The more diverse trusted
apps we analyze, the more complete list of models we ex-
pect to build.
For example, Figure 5(a) shows the topics inferred from
the description of a sample AUA“TripOrganizer”. The topic
“Travel” is highlighted in bold to denote that it is the dom-
inant topic.
Next, sensitive information flows in the AUA are extracted
as described in Section 4.2.2. The extracted flows are then
compared against the flows in the model associated with
the dominant topic. If the AUA contains only flows that
are common according to the model, the app is considered
consistent with the model. If the app contains a flow that is
not present in the model or a flow that is present but is un-
common according to the model, the flow and thus, the app
is classified as anomalous. Anomalous flows require further
manual inspection by a security analyst, because they could
be due to defects, vulnerabilities, or malicious intentions.
For example, Figure 5(b) shows three sensitive informa-
tion flows extracted from “TripOrganizer” app. Since the
dominant topic for this app is “Travel”, these flows can be
checked against the model associated with this topic shown
in Figure 4. Regarding this model, earlier, we computed
that the threshold is τTravel = 7 and the flow (Contacts →
SMS) is common (see Section 4.3). Therefore, flow 1 ob-
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served in “TripOrganizer” (Figure 5(b)) is consistent with
the model. However, flow 2 (Contacts → Internet) and flow
3 (GPS → Bluetooth), highlighted in bold in Figure 5(b),
are uncommon according to the model. As a result, the
AUA “TripOrganizer” is classified as anomalous.
App name Travel Books Tools Game
TripOrganizer 78% 11% 4% 7%
(a) Topics classification
App: TripOrganizer
1: Contacts → SMS
2: Contacts → Internet
3: GPS → Bluetooth
(b) Sensitive information flows
Figure 5: Classification of the app under analysis.
5. EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
In this section, we evaluate the usefulness of our approach
and report the results. We assess our approach by answering
the following research questions:
• RQV ul: Is AnFlo useful for identifying vulnerable apps
containing anomalous information flows?
• RQTime: How long does AnFlo take to classify apps?
• RQTopics: Is the topic feature really needed to detect
anomalous flows?
• RQCat: Can app-store categories be used instead of
topics to learn an accurate Sensitive Information Flow
Model?
• RQMal: Is AnFlo useful for identifying malicious apps?
The first research question RQV ul investigates the result
of AnFlo, whether it is useful for detecting anomalies in
vulnerable apps that, for example, may leak sensitive infor-
mation. RQTime investigates the cost of using our approach
in terms of the time taken to analyze a given AUA. A short
analysis time is essential for tool adoption in a real produc-
tion environment.
Then, in the next two research questions, we investigate
the role of topics as a feature for building the Sensitive In-
formation Flow Models. RQTopics investigates the absolute
contribution of topics, by learning the Sensitive Information
Flow Model without considering the topics and by compar-
ing its performance with that of our original model. To an-
swer RQCat, we replace topics with the categories defined
in the official market, and we compare the performance of
this new model with that of our original model.
Finally, the last research question RQMal investigates the
usefulness of AnFlo in detecting malware based on anomalies
in sensitive information flows.
5.1 Benchmarks and Experimental Settings
5.1.1 Trusted Apps
AnFlo needs a set of trusted apps to learn what is the
normal behavior for “correct and benign” apps. We defined
the following guidelines to collect trusted apps: (i) apps that
come from the official Google Play Store (so they are scruti-
nized and checked by the store maintainer) and (ii) apps that
are very popular (so they are widely used and reviewed by
a large community of end users and programming mistakes
are quickly notified and patched).
At the time of crawling the Google Play Store, it had
30 different app categories. From each category, we down-
loaded, on average, the top 500 apps together with their
descriptions. We then discarded apps with non-English de-
scription and those with very short descriptions (less than 10
words). Eventually, we are left with 11,796 apps for building
references models.
Additionally, we measured if these apps were actively main-
tained by looking at the date of the last update. 70% of the
apps were last updated in the past 6 months before the Play
Store was crawled, while 32% of the apps were last updated
within the same month of the crawling. This supports the
claim that the trusted apps are well maintained.
The fact that the trusted apps we use are suggested and
endorsed by the official store, and that they collected good
end-user feedback allows us to assume that the apps are of
high quality and do not contain many security problems.
Nevertheless, as explained in Section 4.3, our approach is
robust against the inclusion of a small number of anomalous
apps in the training set since we adopt a threshold to classify
anomalous information flows.
5.1.2 Subject Benign Apps
AnFlo works on compiled apps and, therefore the avail-
ability of source code is not a requirement for the analysis.
However, for this experiment sake, we opted for open source
projects, which enable us to inspect the source code and
establish the ground truth.
The F-Droid repository6 represents an ideal setting for our
experimentation because (i) it includes real world apps that
are also popular in the Google Play Store, and (ii) apps can
be downloaded with their source code for manual verification
of the vulnerability reports delivered by AnFlo.
The F-Droid repository was crawled in July 2017 for apps
that meet our criteria. Among all the apps available in this
repository, we used only those apps that are also available in
the Google Play Store, whose descriptions meet our selection
criteria (i.e., description is in English and it is longer than
10 words). Eventually, our experimental set of benign apps
consists of 596 AUAs.
5.1.3 Subject Malicious Apps
To investigate if AnFlo can identify malware, we need a set
of malicious apps with their declared functional descriptions.
Malicious apps are usually repackaged versions of popular
(benign) apps, injected with malicious code (Trojanized);
hence the descriptions of those popular apps they disguise
as can be considered as their app descriptions. Hence, by
identifying the original versions of these malicious apps in
the Google Play Store, we obtain their declared functional
descriptions.
We consider the malicious apps from the Drebin malware
dataset [2], which consists of 5,560 samples that have been
collected in the period of August 2010 to October 2012. We
randomly sampled 560 apps from this dataset. For each
malicious app, we performed static analysis to extract the
6http://f-droid.org/
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package name, an identifier used by Android and by the of-
ficial store to distinguish Android apps7. We queried the
official Google Play market for the original apps, by search-
ing for those having the same package name. Among our
sampled repackaged malicious apps, we found 20 of the apps
in the official market with the same package name. We an-
alyzed their descriptions and found that only 18 of them
have English descriptions. We therefore performed static
taint analysis on these 18 malware samples, for which we
found their “host” apps in the official market. Our static
analysis crashed on 6 cases. Therefore, our experimental set
of malicious apps consists of 12 AUAs.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Detecting Vulnerable Apps
Firstly, AnFlo was used to perform static taint analysis on
the 11,796 trusted apps and topic analysis on their descrip-
tions from the official Play Store. It then learns the Sensitive
Information Flow Models based on the dominant topics and
extracted flows as described in Section 4.3. Then, the AUAs
from the F-Droid repository (Section 5.1.2) have been clas-
sified based on the Sensitive Information Flow Models.
Out of 596 AUAs, static taint analysis reported 76 apps
to contain flows of sensitive information that reach sinks,
for a total of 1428 flows. These flows map to 147 distinct
source-sink pairs. Out of these 76 apps, 14 AUAs are clas-
sified as anomalous. Table 1 shows the analysis results re-
ported by AnFlo. The first column presents the name of
the app. The second column presents the app’s dominant
topic. The third and fourth columns present the source of
sensitive data and the sink identified by static taint analysis,
respectively. As shown in Table 1, in total AnFlo reported
25 anomalous flows in these apps. We manually inspected
the source code available from the repository to determine if
these anomalous flows were due to programming defects or
vulnerabilities. Two apps are found to be vulnerable (high-
lighted in boldface in Table 1), they are com.matoski.
adbm and com.mschlauch.comfortreader.
com.matoski.adbm is a utility app for managing the ADB
debugging interface. The anomalous flow involves data from
the WiFi configuration that leak to other apps through the
Inter Process Communication. Among other information
that may leak, the SSID data, which identifies the network
to which the device is connected to, can be used to infer the
user position and threaten the end user privacy. Hence, this
programming defect leads to information leakage vulnerabil-
ity that requires corrective maintenance. We reported this
vulnerability to the app owners on their issue tracker.
com.mschlauch.comfortreader is a book reader app, with
an anomalous flow of data from IPC to the Internet. Manual
inspection revealed that this anomalous flow results from a
permission re-delegation vulnerability because data coming
from another app is used, without sanitization, for opening
a data stream. If a malicious app that does not have the
permission to use the Internet passes a URL that contains
sensitive privacy data (e.g., GPS coordinates), then the app
could be used to leak information. We reported this vulner-
ability to the app developers.
Regarding the other 12 AUAs, even though they contain
7Even if it is easy to obfuscate this piece of information,
in our experiment some apps did not rename their package
name
anomalous flows compared to trusted apps, manual inspec-
tion revealed that they are neither defective nor vulnerable.
For example, some apps contain anomalous flows that in-
volves IPC. Since data may come from other apps via IPC
(source) or may flow to other apps via IPC (sink), such flows
are considered dangerous in general. However, in these 12
apps, when IPC is a source (e.g., in com.alfray.timeriffic),
data is either validated/sanitized before used in the sink or
used in a way that do not threaten security. On the other
hand, when IPC is a sink (e.g., in com.dozingcatsoftware.
asciicam), the destination is always a component in the
same app, so the flows are not actually dangerous.
Since AnFlo helped us detect 2 vulnerable apps contain-
ing anomalous information flows, we can answer RQV ul by
stating that AnFlo is useful for identifying vulnerabilities
related to anomalous information flows.
5.2.2 Classification Time
To investigate RQTime, we analyze the time required to
classify the AUAs. We instrumented the analysis script with
the Linux date utility to log the time (in seconds) before
starting the analysis and at its conclusion. Their difference
is the amount of time spent in the computation. The exper-
iment was run on a multi-core cluster, specifically designed
to let a process run without sharing memory or computing
resources with other processes. Thus, we assume that the
time measurement is reliable.
Classification time includes the static analysis step to ex-
act data flow, the natural language step to extract topics
from description and the comparison with the Sensitive In-
formation Flow Model to check for consistency. Figure 6 re-
ports the boxplot of the time (in minutes) needed to classify
the F-Droid apps and the descriptive statistics. On aver-
age, an app takes 1.9 minutes to complete the classification
and most of the analyses concluded in less than 3 minutes
(median = 1.5). Only a few (outliers) cases require longer
analysis time.
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Figure 6: Boxplot of classification time.
5.2.3 Topics from App Description
We now run another experiment to verify our claim that
topics are important features to build an accurate model
(RQTopics). We repeated the same experiment as before,
but using only flows as features and without considering
topics, to check how much detection accuracy we lose in this
way.
We still consider all the trusted apps for learning the ref-
erence model, but we only use static analysis data. That
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Table 1: Anomaly detection based on Sensitive Information Flows Model
App Topic Source Sink
a2dp.Vol communications utility
Bluetooth IPC
Bluetooth Modify audio settings
Bluetooth admin Modify audio settingss
Broadcast sticky Modify audio settingss
Modify audio settings Modify audio settingss
com.alfray.timeriffic tools and utility IPC Write settingss
com.dozingcatsoftware.asciicam photo editors Camera IPCs
com.matoski.adbm utility Access WiFi state IPC
com.mschlauch.comfortreader books & readers IPC Internet
com.newsblur productivity IPC Access network states
com.Pau.ImapNotes2 documents manager
Authenticate accounts IPCs
Authenticate accounts Authenticate accountss
Get accounts Authenticate accountss
Get accounts Get accountss
Get accounts Manage accountss
com.thibaudperso.sonyCamera tools & utility
IPC Change WiFi states
NFC NFCs
fr.neamar.kiss security tools IPC Access WiFi states
fr.ybo.transportsrennes utility
Access coarse location Internets
Access fine location Internets
mobi.boilr.boilr financial
IPC Wake lock
Wake lock Wake lock
org.smc.inputmethod.indic languages learning IPC Vibrate
pw.thedrhax.mosmetro books & readers Access WiFi state Change WiFi state
se.anyro.Nfc reader communications utility IPC NFC
is, we do not create a separate matrix for each topic; in-
stead we create one big single matrix with sources and sinks
for all the apps. This Sensitive Information Flow Model is
then used to classify F-Droid apps and the results are shown
in Table 2. As we can see, only four apps are detected as
anomalous by this second approach, and all of them were al-
ready detected by our original, proposed approach. Manual
inspection revealed that all of them are not vulnerable.
This suggests that topic is a very important feature to
learn reference models in order to detect a larger amount
of anomalous apps. In fact, when topics are not considered
and all the apps are grouped together regardless of their
topics, we observe a smoothing effect. Differences among
apps become less relevant to detect anomalies. While in the
previous model, an app was compared only against those
apps grouped under the same topic. Here, an app is com-
pared to all the trusted apps. Without topic as a feature,
our model loses the ability to capture the characteristics of
distinct groups and, thus, the ability to detect deviations
from them.
5.2.4 Play Store Categories
To investigate RQCat, instead of grouping trusted apps
based on topics, we group them according to their app cate-
gories as determined by the official Google Play Store. First
of all we split trusted apps into groups based on the mar-
ket category they belong to8. We then use static analysis
information about flows to build a separate source-sink ma-
trix per each category. Eventually we compute thresholds
8At the time of the crawling, in Google Play Store, a popular
app was assigned to only one category.
to complete the model.
We then classify each AUA from F-Droid by compar-
ing it with the model of the corresponding market cate-
gory. The classification results are reported in Table 3.
Ten apps are reported as containing anomalous flows and
most of them were also detected by our original, proposed
approach (Table 1). Two apps reported by this approach
were not reported by our proposed approach, which are
com.angrydoughnuts.android.alarmclock and com.futurice.
android.reservator. However, they are neither the cases of
vulnerabilities nor malicious behaviors. Only one flow de-
tected by this approach is a case of vulnerability, namely
com.matoski.adbm, highlighted in boldface, which was also
detected by our proposed approach. Hence, this result sup-
ports our design decision of using topics.
5.2.5 Comparison of the Models
Table 4 summarizes the result of the models comparison.
The first model (first row) considers both data flows and
description topics as features. Even though this approach
reported the largest number of false positives (12 apps, ‘FP’
column), we were able to detect 2 vulnerabilities (‘Vuln.’ col-
umn) by tracing the anomalies reported by this approach.
It also detected 5 additional anomalous apps that other ap-
proaches did not detect (‘Unique’ column).
The second model (second row) considers only data flows
as a feature. Even though the number of false positives
drops to 4, we were not able to detect any vulnerability by
tracing the anomalies reported by this approach. This result
suggests that modeling only flows is not enough for detecting
vulnerabilities.
When market categories are used instead of description
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Table 2: Anomaly detection using only information flows as a feature (no topic feature)
App Topic Source Sink
a2dp.Vol Communications utility
Bluetooth Modify audio settings
Bluetooth admin Modify audio settings
Broadcast sticky Modify audio settings
Modify audio settings Modify audio settings
com.Pau.ImapNotes2 Document manager
Authenticate accounts IPC
Authenticate accounts Authenticate accounts
Get accounts Authenticate accounts
Get accounts Get accounts
Get accounts Manage accounts
com.thibaudperso.sonyCamera Utility
IPC Change wifi state
NFC NFC
se.anyro.Nfc reader Communications utility IPC NFC
Table 3: Anomaly detection using Google Play categories as a feature instead of topics
App Category Source Sink
a2dp.Vol Transportation
Bluetooth IPC
Bluetooth Bluetooth
Bluetooth Modify audio settings
Bluetooth admin Modify audio settings
Broadcast sticky Modify audio settings
Modify audio settings Modify audio settings
com.Pau.ImapNotes2 Productivity
Authenticate accounts IPC
Authenticate accounts Authenticate accounts
Get accounts Authenticate accounts
Get accounts Get accounts
Get accounts Manage accounts
com.alfray.timeriffic Tools IPC Write settings
com.angrydoughnuts.android.alarmclock Tools Wake lock Vibrate
com.dozingcatsoftware.asciicam Photography Camera IPC
com.futurice.android.reservator Business Get accounts IPC
com.matoski.adbm Tools Access wifi state IPC
com.thibaudperso.sonyCamera Media and video
IPC Change wifi state
NFC NFC
mobi.boilr.boilr Finance Wake lock Wake lock
se.anyro.Nfc reader Communication IPC NFC
Table 4: Summary of model comparison result
RQ Features FP Unique Vuln.
RQV ul Flows + Topics 12 5 2
RQTopics Flows 4 0 0
RQCat Flows + Market Cat. 9 2 1
topics (last row), the false positives drops to 9 (25% less
compared to our proposed model). It detected 2 additional
anomalous apps that other approaches did not detect (‘Unique’
column). Tracing the anomalies reported by this approach,
we detected only one out of the two vulnerabilities that we
detected using our proposed approach. This result suggests
that topics are more useful than categories for detecting vul-
nerable apps containing anomalous information flows.
5.2.6 Detecting Malicious Apps
Anomalies in the flow of sensitive data could be due to
malicious behaviors as well. The goal of this last experi-
ment is to investigate whether AnFlo can be used to identify
malware (RQMal). To this aim, we use the Sensitive Infor-
mation Flow Model (learned on the trusted apps) to classify
the 18 AUAs from the Drebin malware dataset. Data flow
features are extracted using static analysis from these ma-
licious apps. However, static taint analysis crashed on 6
apps because of their heavy obfuscation. Since improving
the static taint analysis implementation to work on heavy
obfuscated code is out of the scope of this paper, we run the
experiment on the remaining 12 apps. Topics are extracted
from the descriptions of the original versions of those mal-
ware, which are available at the official market store.
The malicious apps have been subject to anomaly de-
tection, based on the three distinct feature sets: (i) flows
and topics; (ii) only flows; and (iii) flows and market cat-
egories. The classification results are shown in Table 5.
The first column reports the malware name (according to
ESET-NOD329 antivirus) and the second column contains
the name of the original app that was repackaged to spread
the malware. The remaining three columns report the re-
sults of malware detection by the three models based on
different sets of features: a tick mark (“4”) means that the
9https://www.eset.com/
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Table 5: Results on malicious apps
Malware Name Repackage App Name Flows + Topics Flows only Flows + Market Cat.
PJApps com.appspot.swisscodemonkeys.steam 4 4 4
DroidKungFu (variant 1) com.gp.jaro (variant) 4 4 4
DroidKungFu (variant 2) com.gp.jaro (variant) 4 6 4
Spy.GoldDream com.rechild.advancedtaskkiller 4 4 4
Anserver com.sohu.blog.lzn1007.WatermelonProber 4 6 4
TrojanSMS.Agent org.baole.app.blacklistpro 4 4 4
model correctly detected the app as anomalous, while a cross
(“6”) means no anomaly detected.
While the model based on topics and the model based on
market categories classified the same 6 AUAs as malicious,
the model based on only flows classified only 4 AUAs as
malicious.
All the malware except TrojanSMS.Agent are the cases of
privacy sensitive information leaks such as device ID, phone
number, e-mail or GPS coordinate, being sent over the net-
work or via SMS. One typical malicious behavior is observed
in Spy.GoldDream. In this case, after querying the list of
installed packages (sensitive data source), the malware at-
tempts to kill selected background processes (sensitive sink).
This is a typical malicious behavior observed in malware
that tries to avoid detection by stopping security products
such as antiviruses. Botnet behavior is observed in Droid-
KunFu. A command and control (C&C) server command
is consulted (sensitive source) before performing privileged
actions on the device (sensitive sink).
As shown in Table 5, when only static analysis features are
used in the model, two malicious apps are missed. This is
because this limited model compares the given AUA against
all the trusted apps, instead of only the apps from a spe-
cific subset (grouped by the common topic or the same cat-
egory). A flow that would have been anomalous for the
specific topic (or the specific category) might be normal for
another topic/category. For example, acquiring GPS coor-
dinate and sending it over the network is common for navi-
gation or transportation apps. However, it is not a common
behavior for tools apps, which is the case of the Anserver
malware.
The remaining 6 apps in the dataset were consistently
classified as not-anomalous by all the models. These false
negatives are mainly due to the malicious behaviors not re-
lated to sensitive information flows, such as dialing calls in
the background or blocking messages. Another reason is
due to the obfuscation by malware to hide the sensitive in-
formation flows. Static analysis inherently cannot handle
obfuscation.
5.3 Limitation and Discussion
In the following, we discuss some of the limitations of
our approach and of its experimental validation. The most
prominent limitation to adopt our approach is the availabil-
ity of trusted apps to build the model of sensitive informa-
tion flows. In our experimental validation, we trusted top
ranked popular apps from the official app store, but we have
no guarantee that they are all immune from vulnerabilities
and from malware content. However, as explained in Sec-
tion 4.3, our approach is quite robust with respect to the
inclusion of a small number of defective, vulnerable, or ma-
licious apps in the training set, as long as the majority of
the training apps are benign and correct. This is because we
use a threshold-based approach that models flows common
to a large set of apps. Thus, vulnerable flows occurring on
few training apps are not learnt as normal in the model and
they would be classified as anomalous when observed in a
given AUA.
A flow classified as anomalous by our model needs further
manual analysis to check if the anomaly is a vulnerability, a
malicious behavior or is safe. Manual inspection could be an
expensive task that might delay the delivery of the software
product. However, in our experimental validation, manual
filtering on the experimental result took quite short time, on
average 30 minutes per app. Considering that the code of the
app to review was new to us, we expect a shorter manual
filtering phase for a developer who is quite familiar with
the code of her/his app. All in all, manual effort required
to manual filter results of the automated tool seems to be
compatible with the fast time-to-market pressure of smart
phone apps.
When building sensitive information flow models, we also
considered grouping of apps by using clustering technique
based on the topics distribution, instead of grouping based
on the dominant topic alone. But we conducted preliminary
experiments using this method and observed that grouping
of apps based on dominant topics produce more cohesive
groups, i.e., apps that are more similar.
Inherently, it is difficult for static analysis-based approaches
including ours to handle obfuscated code. Therefore, if train-
ing apps are obfuscated (e.g., to limit reverse engineering
attacks), our approach may collect incomplete static infor-
mation and only build a partial model. And if the AUA
is obfuscated, our approach may not detect the anomalies.
As future work, we plan to incorporate our approach with
dynamic analysis to deal with obfuscation.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel approach to analyze
the flows of sensitive information in Android apps. In our
approach, trusted apps are first analyzed to extract topics
from their descriptions and data flows from their code. Top-
ics and flows are then used to learn Sensitive Information
Flow models. We can use these models for analyzing new
Android apps to determine whether they contain anomalous
information flows. Our experiments show that this approach
could detect anomalous flows in vulnerable and malicious
apps quite fast.
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